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Looking for Common Ground: Identity Politics and Radical Right Movements

In recent years, there has been a steady upward trend in the popularity of right-wing movements in Europe. Economic, migration and corona crises that consistently hit Europe create and maintain a situation of instability and uncertainty within which right-wing radicals manage to win more and more votes.

Although the cornerstone of contemporary right-wing populist thinking is the defence of the ideas of the individual nation, in the current context the key to further growth is to reach out for cooperation on a supranational level. The basis for such cooperation is identity-related ideas, in which the right-wing radicals focus on a European identity.

Theoretical framework of the study is based on concepts proposed by H.-G. Betz, C. Mudde and T. Van Dijk. Hans Georg. Betz, an expert on populism and right-wing radicalism in liberal democracies, offers an insight into the formation of the phenomenon of the modern radical right. Describing the positions of the Western European Radical Right, Hans-Georg Betz drew attention to following features of modern populist radical right:

- they are radical in their rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system;
- they are right-wing in their rejection of individual and social equality; in their opposition to the social integration of marginalized groups; in their appeal to xenophobia;

- they are populist in their instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment [Betz 1994].

The methodological basis of the study is the conceptualisation of right-wing populism by Cas Mudde, in which he identifies three key components characteristic of right-wing movements: populism, authoritarianism and nativism [Mudde 2007]. In this formulation of the problem, identity can be seen as an association of the common will of the people, it contributes to the principle of preserving the orderliness of society, it accumulates in it the primacy of the rights of indigenous Europeans.

The main tactic of right-wing radicals is to create and postulate an image of the "enemy of society". One of the ways to form such an image is through "categorical generalisations", in which the image of the "outsider" is formed from indications of his differences, deviations and the degree of his threat [van Dijk, 1993]. At the present stage, the migration crisis allows right-wing radicals to form a new image of the enemy, in the role of which a Muslim migrant acts.

The general trend for the European radical right is a radical change of image: from a stronghold of xenophobic conservatives, it seeks to transform itself into a movement that attracts a new electorate: above all, the votes of young people and women. Within the framework of this change (which is reflected, for example, in the "de-demonization" of Marine Le Pen's French "Rassemblement National" and the creation of the Alternative for Germany as a party ready to offer a fresh perspective on German problems), right-wing radicals remain defenders of traditional values, but they are changing the very content of this concept. Traditional values are now understood by right-wing radicals as European values, and European identity becomes one of the most important values in the political programmes of the populist right.

In addition to creating a new image, modern European radicals are also trying to refine their movement by inventing new progressive-sounding terms that hide traditional right-wing concepts associated with nationalism and rejection of immigrants. Joe Mulhall from organization "HOPE not Hate" notes: "They have created a new language and lexicon for the European far right" ¹. Members of the movement try to use "soft", camouflaged versions of terms in their speech, which could save rhetoric from direct comparisons with the negative connotations of radical formulations. For example, the British radical right do not talk about mass deportations - they talk about "reimmigration"; they say "we are not racists, we are ethnopluralists"², which makes it possible to be more attractive to a wide audience, supporting the idea of the uniqueness of each culture and its right to defend its own identity.

One can trace the tendency according to which the radical right associates the problems of the migration crisis and the spreading Islamism with the threat to the well-being of Europeans and their rights. The main attention of the radical right was not focused on the general migrant, but on migrants arriving precisely from Muslim countries.

The 144 Presidential Pledges, the official party program of the French National Rally, states that in order to defeat the threat of terrorism and disrupt the networks of Islamist fundamentalists, it is necessary to «ban and dissolve organizations of all kinds associated with Islamist fundamentalists ... To expel from the country all foreigners associated with Islamist fundamentalism».³ The program also reflects the fact that the main content of the restoration of French freedoms and

¹ As quoted in: Corera G. Is there a growing far-right threat online? // The BBC. 2019. July 8th. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48830980> (accessed: 02.06.2022).

² The Official Account of the Identitarian Movement in England. 2019. July 8th. URL: https://twitter.com/GID_England/status/1148260093869400064 (accessed: 02.06.2022).

³ Les 144 engagements présidentiels. P. 6

the protection of women's rights is «the fight against Islamism, which takes away the fundamental women's freedoms»⁴.

In the party program of «Alternative for Germany» for 2017 election campaign it was explicitly stated that the party «strongly opposes the practice of the Islamic faith, which is directed against a free democratic rule of law, against our laws and against the Christian humanistic basis of our culture»⁵. Pointing out that Islam is not typical of Germany, German radical right point out that the values of Islam are incompatible with the European system of values. In 2021 party program the whole section of the program is devoted to Islam. The focus of the new program is shifting and it is now noted that migrants who have integrated into German society and recognize fundamental rights become “valued members of our society”⁶.

In addition to the appeal of right-wing European parties to a common European identity built on a common history and Christian culture, the grassroots activism of right-wing radicals also attracts interest. Of particular interest is a youth movement that is rapidly gaining momentum in the information field – Generation Identity. The organisation was founded in 2012 in France and has now succeeded in spreading its network across Europe and beyond. Identitarian movement is a movement uniting conservative-minded youth.

The basis on which the agenda of Identity Generation is built has its roots in the politics of "Identitarianism", a set of ideas derived from the works of postwar French thinkers belonging to the "New Right" of the late 1960s, who criticized egalitarianism and reorganized racism as an endorsement of cultural differences by supporting arguments in favor of separateness [Cook, Davie 2002]. The contemporary organization Generation Identity presents itself as a pan-European patriotic youth movement that upholds the values of homeland, freedom and

⁴ Les 144 engagements présidentiels. P. 4

⁵ Alternative for Germany Party program. 2017 P. 53

⁶ Alternative for Germany Party program. 2021 P. 84

tradition through peace activism, political education, and social and cultural activities⁷. However, although the organization stresses that it is not a platform for spreading violent attitudes, one of its official resources includes a manifesto titled "Our declaration of war"⁸.

The main objectives of the youth movement are to resist globalization, to resist the Islamization of Europe and, as a consequence, to prevent the "Great Substitution". The participants of the movement are extremely concerned about the demographic situation in Europe, which, according to them, is in crisis due to the continuous growth of immigrants and the decline in the birth rate.

It is noteworthy that this association goes beyond online activism and organizes street actions. Different branches of Generation Identity use the same methods to popularise ideas: distributing leaflets, stickers, dropping large banners from high places with symbols and slogans and, of course, carrying out concrete actions. Members of the movement are against multicultural policies that are detrimental to a European cultural identity that originates from the Christian and Greek-Latin tradition. In general, the Identitarian movement contributes to the popularization of right-wing radical ideas and the maintenance of discussions about European identity in the youth space.

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Museum Digital Identity: Building a New Vision of Museum Functions in Virtual Environments

Abstract. The paper focuses on the new concept of the museum's digital identity which can be considered as a vision of the museums themselves and the museum functions in the virtual environments. The research is based on the analysis of the museum's websites preserved in the web archives. The author outlines the specifics of a number of the museum's digital components, specifically identity at the organizational, collective and individual level. With an understanding of the value of digital museum content, the importance of investments in the development of virtual museums as an equal part, a virtual extension of a physical museum. In the conclusion, the author raises questions about the motivation of museums in developing digital initiatives, and the need to analyze the period before the World Wide Web on the use of information technologies in museums in order to better understand the foundations of the formation of museum digital identity today.

Keywords: *museums' digital identity, museum functions, digital environments, information technologies, virtual museums.*

1 Introduction

The introduction of information technology in museums began with the digital turn of the mid-1950s. As innovations develop and are accepted by cultural institutions, the attitude of museums towards technology is changing. Museums are moving from the first experiments with information technologies to their active implementation and development of digital transformation strategies that are characteristic of modern times. With the active implementation and adaptation of

information technologies in the museum's activities and the expansion of the networked information environment, the museum is becoming more interactive and more open to participation through digital means, disseminating knowledge, and making the heritage more accessible for study and reuse. Museums are very diverse in terms of scale, topics, artifacts, target audiences, etc., and the vision they have of themselves in virtual space varies. Museums are in the main focus of the research because they preserve human creativity and culture, demonstrating new ideas that address diverse societal issues and serving cultural growth.

Museums' perception of information technology is diverse and has evolved. The first experiments were very cautious, not only because of the high cost of technology but also because the outcomes could be ambiguously interpreted and accepted by both museum professionals and the public. The adaptation of the innovations is always accompanied by the need to test, assess, and validate procedures, to compare the costs including financial, human, and other resources with the potential benefits. Thus, through trials and mistakes in the implementation of various museum projects based on IT, museums are being transformed radically. The timid perception of technology has been substituted by an active pursuit for innovations, as a kind of technological hype.

Museums are undergoing global changes, especially since the mid-90s with the growth of the World Wide Web. Museums are actively beginning to perform in the online space creating websites, a little later connecting to communications in social networks, and producing a variety of digital content for different audiences. Gradually, a specific museum space is being formed in a virtual environment, which becomes a digital department, an extension of a real museum. This digital department, or rather a virtual museum, indicates the formation of a new museum identity in the digital space.

Development of the virtual museums as valuable and impactful information resources depends a lot on the national strategies of digitization in the cultural sector

and also refers to the museum perception of the technology and understanding the purposes of these activities. The pandemic became a compelling circumstance that stimulated a lot of digitization processes in the museums and motivated them to communicate more closely with the virtual visitors online. Statistics show that during the Covid-crisis museums advanced digital initiatives in different directions such as creating podcasts and newsletters, making learning programs, designing online exhibitions, publication collections online, organizing live events, and various activities in social media [1]. So, the digital environment of the museums changed a lot which assumes the evolution of the museum's digital identity.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the museum's digital identity as a concept and to identify its constituent components at the collective and individual levels. The paper focuses mainly on the analysis of the snapshots of the museum's websites preserved in the web archives showing the formation of the museums' digital identity on the web.

2 Relevant Studies

Researchers studying identities in museum fields often pay attention to the formation of social identities by the museums. Thus, it is well shown that the museums are actively involved in the process of shaping a national identity (for example, B. Trofanenko analyses the role of the public museums in the identity construction as the basis of messages at the museum exhibitions and the use of the museum narrative at the educational process [2]). Other researchers investigate the ways of constructing national identity with the help of visual, textual and multimedia formats of historical narrative in the museum (for example, E. Hooper-Greenhill analyzes visual aids and contexts [3]). The authors also investigate the roles of different types of museums in the formation of national identity (e.g. B. Filene focuses on the history museums [4]; Th. Stylianou-Lambert studies role of the Art museums in this process [5]), analyse inequalities and racial issues reflected by the

museums (e.g. Sh. Li concentrates on the ways the Art museums address the identity crisis in the US [6]).

With regard to museum identity and digital space, researchers focus on more specific issues. In particular, the authors study the influence of digital museum content on the identity of virtual visitors, and also analyze brand design which is more likely connected to relations with users/consumers or consider museums as providers of identity for their audiences [7]. The shaping of the museums' digital environment has been mainly examined from the perspective of the practical application of various technologies and approaches to the development of website content, entertaining visitors and engaging communities, in terms of amenities, of improving existing resources, and designing new ones. The history of museums on the web has been considered in perspectives of early websites construction (e.g. J.P. Bowen analyzes a set of digital museum resources, including those distributed on CD-ROM, tracing the acceptance of new technologies by the museums [8]), increasing interactivity (e.g. P.L. Arthur examines the development of interactive technologies in real and virtual museum spaces in a historical perspective [9]), advancement of the participatory practices (e.g. B. Axelsson investigates their evolution in the context of Digital Media [10]), and transformation of museum functions (K. Perera and D. Chandra consider the movement towards people and meaning oriented museum websites [11]). In the core of the current discussions about digital transformation of the museums there are the changes in the museums roles, their impact on the society, and the effective ways to deliver these values to the audiences through digital means [12]. However, the museum's vision of itself in a digital environment remains somewhat under-considered. This research raises questions about unique characteristics and evolution of museums and having their identity at stake in this digital environment.

3 Museum Digital Identity: Definition

The terminology used is relatively new and it is necessary to clarify what is meant by Museum Digital Identity. To consider this, it is necessary to tackle the general theory of identity. There are several types of identity, including personal and group, which are divided into varieties. Identity may characterize the cultural, national, racial, gender and other specifics inherent by a person, group of people or communities [13].

In the digital age identity theory inevitably draws attention to the features associated with the digital transformation of the world, institutions, organizations, people, and individuals [14]. The term "digital identity" is quite common in computer science and cybersecurity and implies a convergence to "set of attributes related to an entity" [15]. In this regard, digital identity is presented as some kind of unique information necessary to determine compliance in the information system for validation in access to information. In this paper, the understanding of digital identity has a different context and refers to museums and their functioning in the digital environment.

The museum can be considered as an organization, as a type of a cultural institution. For organizations, such as museums, identity is necessary in order to effectively articulate and achieve their goals [16]. An organization is a group of people, a cluster of individuals who work in a common direction. Therefore, a team in an organization is a more complex structure than simply the sum of individuals. Consequently, the team or teams within the organization determine the identity of the organization and shape it. The identity of the organization reflects an understanding of the specifics of the activity, as well as more complicated things, such as a development strategy and manifestation of its mission. The definition of the mission of the museum and its understanding also correlates with the identity of the museum as an organization. Therefore, the implementation of the museum

mission in the digital space, through online means and the creation of a variety of digital content, determine the museum's digital identity.

Building a museum's digital identity is largely related to the museum's ability to distinguish itself, its functions, and its information products from the resources of other types of institutions. Comparing museum websites with those of other organizations, some content may appear to be very similar to the resources of archives, libraries, or academic organizations (for example, galleries, virtual exhibitions, or electronic catalogs of images are produced by all of these). That is why it is crucial to discuss museums' digital identity as it has been shaped through the introduction of information technologies and the development of virtual museums. The concept of the identity of museums in the digital environment refers to a new vision of museum functions and self-identification in the digital space, the understanding of new mission, and the creation of appropriate resources that reveal their new role.

Museums' digital identity is being shaped by the awareness of the value and significance of the content produced, understanding of target audiences, and their needs. The applied level of formation of museum identity in the digital environment today refers to the development of museum web resources. So, the evolution of the museum identity in the virtual environment might be treated from an historical perspective and considered as the transformation of the first museum sites on the web into a virtual museum. This is not just a museum website but it is an information resource that provides the opportunities to the museums to realize the different museum functions remotely bringing the values of the museums and various digital content to the virtual audiences.

Summarizing what has been said about the theory of identity, it is important to emphasize that the concept of museum digital identity refers to the intentional use of information technologies by museums, the creation of museum digital resources for their remote use by different categories of users (various audiences), the

development of a digital infrastructure (including websites and platforms) for the implementation of museum functions. As a part of museum identity, is digital identity, which first of all, relates to the vision of the museum functions delivered through the digital environment, the design of digital resources and online activities bringing new perspectives for museum development, and their unique features in digital space. This raises questions about the characteristics, evolution, and specificities of this digital identity of museums which will be considered in the paper.

In addition, the identity of museums in the digital environment should be considered from the perspective of museum subjectivity [17]. In the context of museums and their activities in virtual environments, subjectivity can be understood as a process of evolution, the development of museums' awareness of themselves, their role and functions in the online space. It must be highlighted that it is the process of development that is critically important as a characteristic of identity, and not a constant, permanent in time and coordinates.

4 Reconstructing Museum Digital Identity: Sources and Research Methodology

This research is largely based on the historical analysis of web archives. To identify the key components of the museums' digital identity, web sources were put into the focus. Web archives allow users to retrieve interactive copies of websites collected in the aggregate format united web pages and web content on them [18]. They are available from 1996 in the Wayback Machine of the Internet Archive [19] and on the platforms of archiving institutions and libraries.

Web archived materials, the snapshot of the museum web-sites and tracing the changes on them helped to reconstruct the evolution of the museums online at present and changes in the museum digital identity. Snapshots of the websites allow the user to replay the preserved webpage and content on it, to proceed under

hyperlinks, to observe metadata and other stored information. The user gets the opportunity to study the design of the website, its structural and content features. Web archives preserve and generate the metadata, including information about the time and date when the page was saved, frequency it was updated, and the period when the particular webpage existed on the live web.

Naturally, especially in the very beginning of the introduction of web preservation programs, some of the content was not collected and has been lost. Snapshots of museum websites are being archived at a specific time and contain this information in metadata. Niels Brügger notes that archived websites in general are a kind of chimera. In the preserved form at the web archive the websites have never existed in the live web because parts of the websites can be crawled at different dates, and theoretically, during this period of time the website could change both structurally and in content [20]. In general, web content is characterized by a high degree of dynamism in changing content, which is not always adequately reflected in web archived materials or metadata. This must be taken into account in reconstruction of the websites' history.

In addition to the mentioned specifics of web preservation, there are also various limitations related to the national strategies, priorities, and process of web archiving. Among them, for example, the highly centralized processes of web archiving and the lack of national web archiving programs in many countries. These circumstances affect the comprehensiveness of preservation of national web resources and, as a result, researchers rely on materials accumulated in the global Internet Archive or other large repositories. A significant limitation of web preservation also relates to the quality of the crawled and archived material, including gaps in preserved content and omissions at the scanning stage. Such technical problems include broken links and errors, insufficient depth of the website scanned by the crawler. The technical obsolescence affects significantly on the quality of digital preservation [21] and format obsolescence is also a serious problem

and requires special approaches to the replay of materials. There are a number of other restrictions as well. Therefore, it is so difficult to evaluate the completeness of the stored information, and often the researcher has to reconstruct the history of websites from fragments of the preserved material.

Thus, snapshots of museum websites make it possible to observe the preserved museums' digital content, analyse the functions the museums performed through the websites, assess the potential of virtual museums as a special digital extensions of the real museum. Archived versions of museum websites show both targeted audiences and how those audiences were defined and addressed by the museums, what groups were specified and what type of content was created for them. That is, the analysis of websites in a historical retrospective allows us to reconstruct the development of museum digital identity. At the same time, when reconstructing a museum's digital identity, it is necessary to carry out high-quality source criticism of sources, as well as to understand the features of web archiving.

The museums' online environment is characterized by a variety of information resources, digital initiatives, formats, and methods for representing data on websites. Addressing the issues of museum digital identity requires appropriate research methodology. The research methodology entwines the information approach thanks to Digital Humanities, Digital History, and Digital Hermeneutics. It allows us to consider data as a unit of information and analyze it in a quantitative way [22]. The principles of Digital Hermeneutics are indispensable to interpret information from the websites [23]. Andreas Fickers pays attention to the layered character of historical sources in digital environment [24] and the need to analyse digital sources understanding authenticity and credibility of digital materials. The information approach and principles of Digital Hermeneutics are necessary for a comprehensive analysis in order to gain new knowledge on the museum digital identity.

5 Components of the Museum Digital Identity

5.1 Collective and individual levels

Museum digital identity as museums' vision of their value and ability to carry out museum functions in the digital environment can be articulated at different levels. It can be reflected at collective or individual level. The collective level of identity is manifested at the national or global level of museum associations. Museums can be united at the national level and can formulate common development strategies, including those in the digital environment. Therefore, the digital transformation programs of museums reflect the museum digital identity of the collective level.

It is important to mention national strategies in the formation of the museums digital identity intended to advance the museums towards the creation of a valuable and impactful digital space. Forecasting the further perspectives of the museum digital environment is possible based on an understanding of its previous trajectories, expanding the opportunities for using the digital resources in various sectors such as research, education, creative industries, etc. and by multiple audiences. Diversity in various perspectives (such as formats, interactivity, targeted audiences, content development in terms of gender, race, age, and other equality) may be implemented in the best way to reveal the greatest social impact of the museums' digital environment for the better future. Development of the museums digital identity is a crucial point for transforming digital resources, increasing social and cultural impact in a meaningful way.

The museum identity can also be expressed in the key terminology by the museum organizations. The museum is a such a key term and the authoritative definition of a museum was proposed by the International Council of Museums (ICOM) in 2009: "A museum is a non-profit, permanent institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves,

researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment” [25]. Obviously, this definition does not express any digital component in the activities of museums. The council noticed this circumstance and outdated character of the definition due to the fact that it does not fully reflect the diversity of functions and values of the museum as a cultural institution. ICOM consultations with national branches should help develop a new shared definition of the concept of a museum. So far, 2 rounds of such consultations have taken place. Work on a single definition is ongoing, but it should be noted that the digital component is already highlighted in the intermediate results [26].

5.2 Defining the balance between Physical and Digital

At the individual level (i.e. the level of separate museums), in order to analyze the museum's digital identity, it is necessary to identify its components. These components are determined based on analysis of websites and snapshots of the websites stored in the web archives. The analysis of websites from a historical perspective, the identification of the components of museum digital identity at the individual level practically reflects the history of virtual museums as information resources [27] valuable for remote use.

Understanding of museum digital identity as a characteristic of a museum requires the designation of facts that reflect the importance of digital space in the activities of a real museum. This significance can be formulated based on an understanding of the role of digital resources and tools in the functioning of a physical museum. The creation of diverse digital content for remote use is a key feature of digital museum identity. The project “Digital History of Virtual Museums” [28], implemented by the author of this paper, presents several museum cases, traces the evolution of digital museum content intended for use by virtual visitors, and also identifies the audiences for whom this content is aimed. The

Infographics section introduces schemes for tracing the complication of digital initiatives on the websites of five museums from around the world. The variety of content and its detailed elaboration, targeting certain audiences directly reflect the high value of the museum's digital identity status.

A significant characteristic of identity is also the determination of the balance between the activities of the museum in real and virtual environments. As the museum digital identity is formed, the digital component becomes more and more significant and comparable to the attention paid to real activities in the physical museum. In the early years of the adaptation of information technology by museums, binary discussions were common, determining what is better and more valuable for the museums and communities - real or digital. There was widespread skepticism among museum professionals about whether the digital component could be any substitute for the actual physical object and interaction with it. Therefore, digital initiatives have been for a long time at the secondary roles in comparison to the activities at the real museum. With the development of technology and the implementation of interactive aids, it became clear that the digital space does not replace, but complements the real one. The virtual extension to the real museum makes the visitor's experience more diverse. These are not competing, but complementary environments. In the virtual space, this balance between the physical and digital extension to the museum can be traced through visual and textual means.

6 Home Page as a Message

It is important to pay attention to a number of extrinsic characteristics reflected on the website. First of all, the main such components refer to the main page and the content published on it, that is, what the visitor notices visiting the website.

Components on the homepage can be associated with naming and indicate the museum's digital identity. So, when the first museum websites appeared, it was

necessary to highlight the specifics of digital content, emphasize its contrast with analog content by selecting a remarkable name of the web resource or its sections. Thus, such names as Web Museum, Digital Museum, Museum Online, Museum Explorer, Virtual Museum, and etc. appeared. Also special titles for digital content - Virtual Tours, Digital Collections, Virtual Exhibitions, Online Exhibits, and some others - have been formulated. The pursuit for new names indicates the need to define new content and its specific features, designate the resource as a virtual component or extension to the real museum created for the remote use of the museum treasures in the digital format.

The main page of the museum website demonstrates the priorities of the museum in its functioning. Analysing the visual and textual messages on the websites it is possible to determine the role and place of the digital initiatives and the virtual museum as a whole in the museum activities. At the beginning of the WWW era, the physical space absolutely dominated, and websites served to invite the virtual visitor to a real museum. With the advancement of web technology and the development of museum digital identity, digital activities online have been taking a significant role. It is possible to detect the change in these trends in visual aids on websites (such as photos, images, animations, etc). Initially, many museums published photos of the entrance to the real museum on the main page of the website, thereby inviting the visitor to the real museum. There is an example of the website of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, where for a long time a photograph published on the main page depicted an iconic architectural building and the entrance to the museum itself (see Appendix, the pic. 1). Gradually, such photos on the main page being replaced by images of the museum treasures. The opportunities to interact with these museum objects have been implemented. The MET Museum has also begun publishing highlights from the museum's collections on the home page of the website (see Appendix, the pic. 2).

It is interesting to consider visual and textual messages as a characteristic of museum digital identity, which encourage a virtual visitor (user) to interact with the digital resources. These messages perform as a guide making it easier for the visitor to navigate the website and indicating the purpose of the digital content. Also, the messages are of crucial importance to consider due to the need to understand the interaction between a human and a computer in the museum's digital environment. For example, the website of The Franklin Institute Science Museum included the snapshot made on February 5, 1997, which was dedicated to "The Heart Preview Gallery", and we can see a direct guide to action. All sections on the page indicate the very particular activities such as "Do", "See", "Learn", "Go", and "Hear" (see Appendix, the pic. 3).

Another component that helps us to define the well-shaped museum digital identity relates to digital content produced by museums for specific audiences. It is important that these target audiences are clearly articulated so that specific categories of users are identified. The first websites rarely contained references to any particular groups defined on ages or social strata for example. Rather, the image of the visitor was very general. Gradually, different categories of users begin to be expressed on the websites, to whom the content is addressed. And these audiences are getting divided accordingly to the main directions of the usage of content such as research (e.g. Scholars, Researchers), or education (e.g. Teachers, Pupils). It is important to mention that targeted groups are starting to split up, as groups of schoolchildren defined by age, for example. There are other audiences, including family ones. This designation of audiences demonstrates the understanding by the museum in serving targeted groups of virtual visitors.

It is possible also to list other components of the museum digital identity - for example, museum mottos, logos, attractive visual aids, interactive tools, which favor the online space, and digital activities. These and other components make it feasible

to put together the puzzle of museum digital identity, to highlight the importance of digital space for the functioning of the museum.

7 Conclusion

In conclusion, it is necessary to raise questions for further study that are directly related to museum digital identity.

Naturally, awareness of the importance of the web space by the museums was not formed immediately but gradually evolved. It was based on the experience of using information technologies in museums in various areas prior to the widespread of the World Wide Web. The development of web technologies has brought new challenges and new opportunities to museums. Therefore, it is not surprising that many of the first websites had a particular function because they articulated information about the physical museum, the exhibitions held in it, and provided details to prepare for a real visit to the museum. Progressively, the content of websites is changing, the proportion of digital materials intended for remote use is increasing. In general, museums' digital identity was formed in close relationship with a vision of new museum functions, and an ability to react to new challenges facing museums in the online era. Therefore, it is so important to determine the development of this digital identity before the World Wide Web.

Museum identity in the digital space was formed with the development of self-awareness of the significance of the implementation of museum functions in the digital environment. The manifestation of the museum digital identity, the degree of its expression is directly related to the content that museums produced, its complexity, and the ability to attract users. We can talk about well-shaped museum digital identity from the moment when the digital component and virtual space begin to appear in mission statements by the museums, with its increased social impact via the digital environment.

Museums are characterized by altering degrees of formation and articulation of museum digital identity. However, the motives of the museums to expand their presence in the online space should be analyzed more precisely, especially because the museum can be absolutely self-sufficient, functioning mainly or exclusively in the physical space. The pandemic clearly showed the importance of such remote work, acted as a significant trigger to develop digital initiatives and engage the museum audiences remotely. However, other circumstances can refer to the enormousness of museum collections, which cannot be demonstrated constantly in the exhibitions of real museums and which are locked in the storage. Then the museum's motive is clear to digitize the collections and present them in a virtual museum, displaying its treasures and opening them to the public. An explanation of a higher level can reflect the understanding of the value of virtual space for new audiences that will never or hardly be able to come to a physical museum and this layer of virtual travelers continues to grow. Understanding the value of museum collections and unique artifacts, accumulated knowledge and experience, the desire to share and to be open for society, overcoming the boundaries of physical space and simultaneously moving into a digital one, create additional opportunities for the development of museums and their activities for the benefit of society and humanity.

The question of the driving force behind the development of museum digital identity remains to be explored, as well as the role of technology and innovation in this process. It is impossible to give an unambiguous assessment, since human potential and creativity, the ability to think out of the box are interconnected with scientific and technological progress. The adaptation of information technologies by museums, their sustainable, long-term use, implementation of digital means in the development strategy, and following the path of implementing this strategy is at the same time a way to develop the identity and strengthen the self-awareness of museums in the digital environment.

In addition, attention should be paid to the multilayered character of the digital museum identity, which should be studied on a whole complex of sources. Museum websites and snapshots of the websites from the web archives are key sources for exploring museum digital identity, but not the only ones. Of particular interest are social networks, as well as mobile application repositories, which can show specifics of communication channels alternative to websites and other options for digital content.

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9 Appendix



Pic. 1. Fragment of the snapshot of the Main Page of the Metropolitan Museum's website on 11 November 1996. Wayback Machine [29].



Pic. 2. Fragment of the snapshot of the Main Page of the Metropolitan Museum's website on 4 March 2000. Wayback Machine [30].

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REGIONALIST PARTIES OF NORTHERN IRELAND AS ACTORS OF IDENTITY POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

The regional party system of Northern Ireland is usually characterized by a confrontation between two political blocs. The Unionist Bloc, whose key constituency has traditionally been the region's Protestant majority, is represented by the Democratic and the Ulster Unionist Parties. The nationalist bloc whose electoral preferences are expressed by representatives of the Catholic Irish minority in the region, is represented by the Sinn Féin Party and the Social Democratic Labour Party. Traditionally, the key division of the party-political space of Northern Ireland into two blocs is the issue of the status of the region: the unionists defend the idea of the unity of the United Kingdom, while the nationalists demand reunification with the Republic of Ireland. But also, the important key — the identity policy.

In the second half of the 2010s, in the party-political space of Northern Ireland, there was a decrease in electoral support for the unionist parties (the Democratic Unionist and Ulster Unionist Party). Unionists lost their dominant status following the results of the March 2017 regional parliamentary elections (40/90 seats). The downward trend in support for Unionists in Northern Ireland was confirmed twice in 2019 – first in May in the European Parliament elections (1/3 seats), then in the national parliamentary elections (only 8/18 seats from Northern Ireland for the Unionist Democrats). For the first time in a long time, the Unionist forces in Northern Ireland lost their dominant position in the party-political system of the region. At the same time, there is an increase in the electoral stability of alternative parties in Northern Ireland that do not belong to the traditional ideological

spectrum of "unionism-nationalism" in the region. These parties – the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, the Green Party of Northern Ireland, and the People Before Profit Party – are manifesting demands that are often different from the traditional agenda regarding ethnolinguist and confessional statuses of the population, focusing primarily on pragmatic issues of the social, economic and administrative policy of the region.

The paper is focused on regionalists parties of Northern Ireland as actors of identity politics. It describes how regionalists parties manifesting the identity topics and issues in various ways to improve their political (electoral and institutional) positions. The author underlines the different strategies of three political blocks (unionists, nationalists, alternative) regarding identity politics in Northern Ireland. The paper is structured as follows. First, the dynamics of regional party system of Northern Ireland in 2010s is demonstrated. Then, the author argues that regional party system is still a reflection of identity matrix of Northern Ireland population. The final part of the paper is devoted to analysis of strategies of regionalists parties on identity politics in Northern Ireland.

Regional parties are understood in the article as regional parties with regionalists agenda and ideology that demands for self-rule and shared-rule for region [Hepburn, 2009; Massetti, 2009; Massetti, 2016]. Identity politics in the article is considered from the confessional (catholic and protestant) and political (nationalist and unionists) point of view which is the key political cleavage in Northern Ireland.

DYNAMICS OF NORTHERN IRELAND REGIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

Party system of Northern Ireland till beginning of 2010s is stable one. At the same time we can underline some dynamics trends last 5-7 years. The cross-temporal comparative analysis of the regional party system based on five classic criteria

(number of parties, effective number of parties, fragmentation of the party system, electoral instability, ideological polarization) demonstrates the following results.

In many quantitative terms, the Northern Ireland regional party system does appear to be very stable. The total number of parliamentary parties is seven to eight, which makes it possible to characterize the parliamentary system as plural (a system of extreme pluralism). The effective number of parties shows slight fluctuations (from 4.26 to 4.71) and only in the first electoral period does it fluctuate (5.75). The Fragmentation Index is also quite stable over the study period (0.7822 on average) and indicates a relatively low level of fragmentation and fractionalisation of the regional party system in Northern Ireland. At the same time, the results of the analysis demonstrate of the dynamics of two indicators of the party system in the period of 2000-2010s: (1) the electoral stability of the party system and (2) its ideological polarization.

Table 1. Dynamics of NI Regional Party System.

Indicators	998	003	007	011	016	017	verage
Parties							.500
Significant Parties							.1667
ENP	.7537	.7125	.3459	.2643	.3290	.4444	.6416
Fragmentation IRae	.8262	.7878	.7699	.7655	.7690	.7750	.7822
Electoral Instability	.05	.00	.45	.45	.6	.85	.8333
Ideological Poles							.3333

Source: compiled by the author based on electoral and parliamentary data from the Northern Ireland Assembly.⁹

In terms of electoral stability the data indicate a redistribution of electoral preferences and a slight increase in the level of electoral instability. First, changes in electoral support are more common in constituencies that have traditionally shown support for the Unionists (Belfast, East Antrim, Lagan Valley, North Down, Upper Bann). At the same time, electoral districts that traditionally show support for nationalist forces are stable in preferences and / or if they change, it is more likely from one nationalist party to another (as, for example, in the districts of Foyle and Fermanagh and South Tyrone). More than that, the alternative Alliance Party and the Green Party of Northern Ireland are successful primarily in traditional unionist constituencies (Belfast East, Belfast South, Lagan Valley, Strangford, Antrim South, Antrim East, Down North) and compete for the electorate precisely with unionist parties (for example, the rivalry between the Greens and the Ulster Unionists for a mandate in the district of South Belfast). Also redistribution of electoral preferences is somewhat more significant at the national and European electoral levels. This is probably due, first of all, to the issues of the status of the region, European politics and the conditions for Brexit, the importance of which is growing in the framework of multi-level interactions and activities of party actors in the national and European space. Alternative parties demonstrate a significant increase in electoral indicators at the regional level – from 3.70% in 2003 to 13.2% in 2017. The alternative parties are not yet able to compete with the two mainstream party blocs, but they may well lay claim to the institutional potential (including the coalition/government potential). Indicative in this regard is the dynamics of the main centrist party – the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland. The electoral power of the party has increased by 2.5 times since 2003 (from 3.70% to 9.10% in 2017), which makes it possible to impose

9 Northern Ireland Elections. Northern Ireland Assembly. URL: <http://www.niassembly.gov.uk> (accessed 12.05.2022).

a competition (so far, mainly in the electoral field) between the Ulster Unionist Party and the Social Democratic Labour Party. Given the effective number of parties in the Northern Ireland party (4.64 on average), the position of the third-fourth largest party force in the region can expand the political subjectivity of the Alliance Party and serve as a new trigger for the dynamics of the regional party system.

The dynamics of the electoral preferences of the Northern Irish electorate as a correlating effect has a shift in the ideological balance of the regional party system in Northern Ireland. During the 1990s-2000s, we can see a stable bipolar ideological structure of the regional party system, in which the unionist pole (DUP, UUP) occupies a priority position in the terms of institutional potential, and the nationalist pole has a slightly less institutional capacity. In the second half of the 2010s, the ideological reconfiguration of the Northern Ireland party system is taking place, which is the most important characteristic of its dynamics. Strict ethno-confessional electoral voting preferences are changes. Firstly, the loss of electoral results of the unionists was reflected in their institutional (parliamentary) strength – 43.33% of the seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly in the current 2017-2021 party system (-11.29% compared to 2003). Secondly, the nationalists, in turn, are gradually strengthening their own institutional positions - also 43.33% of the seats in the regional legislature and an increase of 4.45% compared to the previous period. Thirdly, alternative parties (the Alliance Party, the Green Party, the People Before the Profit party) strengthen their own institutional subjectivity and become the third pole, for the first time overcoming the ten percent “barrier of coalition potential” (10.73% of seats in 2017-2021). The increase in the political subjectivity of alternative parties that ideologically do not belong to either the unionist or nationalist blocs forms a moderate centrist ideological wing. And at the same time we are observe erasing/decay/deconstruction the traditional ideological bipolarity of the Northern Ireland party system.

Such dynamics of the party system in Northern Ireland in the 2010s is a manifestation of the reaction of party actors to modern challenges. The dynamics of the regional party system suggests that traditional challenges in the context of recent years are acquiring additional dimensions and focuses. Among these factors (challenges), it is needed to mention three key factors that have a decisive significance on the dynamics of the regional partime: the instability of the regional political system built on ethno-confessional criteria; the membership in the European Union and the future status of Northern Ireland; change in the demographic structure of the regional community.

PARTY SYSTEM AS REFLECTION OF NI IDENTITY CONFIGURATION

It supposed that one of the key factors of Northern Ireland party system is demographic changes. Data of Northern Ireland Census demonstrates demographic dynamics during past several decades. The previous census in 2011 put the Protestant population at 48%, just 3% more than Catholics at 45%.¹⁰ More recent figures from 2016 show that among those of working age 44% are now Catholic and 40% Protestant. The difference is even more marked among schoolchildren with 51% Catholic, 37% Protestant. Only among the over 60s is there a majority of Protestants with 57%, compared to Catholics on 35%.¹¹ Northern Ireland 2021 census results to be published in June 2022. But at the same time many honourable scholars like John Coakley told us that it Catholic population will be 47% over than Protestant 46% (and may be even bigger share) [Coakley, 2019]. And it will be the first time of Catholic majority in Northern Ireland.

At the same time traditional electoral configuration of Northern Ireland is remain the same nowadays. Some slightly changes are well observed but they are

¹⁰ Census Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. URL: <https://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/census> (accessed 12.05.2022).

¹¹ Census Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. URL: <https://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/census> (accessed 12.05.2022).

not so serious: Catholics mostly are still nationalists and protestant mostly are still unionists. For example, the 2019 Northern Ireland Life and Times survey showed that 59% of Catholics think of themselves as nationalists, with 39% thinking of themselves as neither nationalists nor unionists and 54% of Protestant think of themselves as unionists. At the same time in 1998, 33% of people identified as neither unionist or nationalist.¹² But 20 years later that figure has reached 50%. It means that political confrontation between nationalist/unionist became less significant.

While it is widely expected that the 2021 census will reveal that the proportion of the population coming from a Catholic background is now larger than those from a Protestant background, this doesn't mean that there will necessarily be a Catholic absolute majority – if that term is used to mean more than 50% of the population. As John Coakley has written "Catholics (by background) will reach at least parity with Protestants by 2021, with each at 46 per cent".¹³ Political scientist Paul Nolan also agrees, arguing that there's a difference between the Catholic community becoming the larger of the two communities and it becoming an absolute majority (and, we might add, of a majority of the population who are eligible to vote).¹⁴ Brendan O'Leary, meanwhile, writes that "Northern Ireland no longer has an ethnic, religious, or political majority. It has two and a fraction major bloc that are each minority: unionists, nationalists, and others, which partly reflects transformations of its demography of Protestants, Catholics, and Others."¹⁵

12 Perceptions of the PPS survey results | Public Prosecution Service Northern Ireland. URL: <https://ppsni.gov.uk> (accessed 12.05.2022).

13 What will – and won't – the 2021 census tell us about Northern Ireland's future? | Northern Slant. URL: <https://www.northernslant.com/what-will-and-wont-the-2021-census-tell-us-about-northern-irelands-future/> (accessed 12.05.2022).

14 What will – and won't – the 2021 census tell us about Northern Ireland's future? | Northern Slant. URL: <https://www.northernslant.com/what-will-and-wont-the-2021-census-tell-us-about-northern-irelands-future/> (accessed 12.05.2022).

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For sure demography configuration is not necessarily the political destiny. One lesson of the 2021 census results may well be that nationalists and unionists alike need to develop strategies that appeal beyond traditional sectarian lines and to Northern Ireland's growing population of "neithers", not Protestant and not Catholic, will likely play a significant role in determining the constitutional future. Thus there are two main political implications of demographic changes in Northern Ireland: (1) there will be no political majority - alternative parties will have potential institutional significance especially coalition politics; (2) nationalists (less) and unionists (more) need to renew/develop party strategy to be competitive during next electoral cycles.

IDENTITY POLICY AND STRATEGIES OF NI REGIONALIST PARTIES

In this regards I tried to analyse the party strategies regarding identity politics, especially in the term of confessional and political identity. Recent party manifestos, Manifesto Project Data Base (which is primary content analysis on party manifestos) and some official statements of political leaders is used as the main research data.¹⁶


Based on context of demographic and identity transformation last several years, I suppose there are three main strategy that regionalists parties using currently.

1. Status-Que: same agenda + same confessional electorate base.
2. Agenda Shifting: wider agenda + policy including opposite or neutral electorate base.
3. Catch-All Regional Party: identity neutral wide agenda + wide electorate base.

1. 16 Manifesto Project Data Base. URL: <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/> (accessed 12.05.2022).

Infographics on the Picture 1 demonstrates the dynamics of political agenda of the main unionists and nationalists parties. The unionists political parties (DUP and UUP) show decline of British nationalist agenda and support of universal agenda for all society. In contrary the nationalist parties (SP and SDLP) show the rise of Irish nationalist agenda and support of exclusive agenda for Irish society. The dynamics of nationalists' agenda and rhetoric of two main political parties – Sinn Fein and DUP – is well observed. Irish nationalist agenda of Sinn Fein is still increase (one third of whole manifesto) + support of exclusive agenda for Irish society, while unionists reduce British nationalist agenda + support of universal agenda for all society.

Picture 1. Agenda of Regionalist Parties of Northern Ireland



Comparing the nationalists policy and agenda of the Northern Ireland political parties compare to others topics and policies (social policy and economic policy) some interesting points are founded. First of all, nationalists catholic and irish policy is still increase only in Sinn Fein agenda and strategy. Other parties reduce national and identity subjects of their manifestos and statements. There are

mainly aimed to social and economic policies rather than national and identity politics. Second of all, we have got very big differences of priorities of SF and another nationalists political party – SDLP which is more centric and neutral in all terms.

Moreover there are significant differences between parties strategies regarding identity politics. The unionists parties – Democratic Unionists and Ulster Unionists – are facing with political challenges: they losing electoral positions and constituencies (mostly to the alternative parties) and they losing their electoral base due to demographic decline of protestants. The main strategy of the unionists might be considering as *agenda adaptation for electoral stability*. It includes the following points:

1. broadening party agenda: including issues common for both communities;
2. inclusive strategy for electorate with neutral confessional and ideological position;
3. support all the citizens from Northern Ireland of United Kingdom no matter identity configuration;
4. ethno-nationalist and confessional agenda have become rare, and there are suggestions that this is a move towards liberalism on their part;
5. mediator role between UK government and NI nationalists during post Brexit.

The nationalists parties – Sinn Fein and Social Democratic and Labour Party – are developing their strategy from stronger electoral and institutional position (rather than unionists): they have strong and stable electoral and institutional position and strong and increasing electoral base (especially in term of future catholic majority). The main strategy of the nationalist parties might be considering as *a status-quo and gaining institutional strength*. It includes the following points:

1. strategy and agenda remains the same;
2. support of Irish nationalism and Irish Catholic Community;
3. deliberate position on party relations (especially with unionists) and coalition politics;
4. against Northern Irishness as identity and self identification category;
5. SDLP moving to centre (economic and social policy) and try to avoid identity.

The alternative parties of Northern Ireland – mostly Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, - stand the moderate position and have electoral stability and institutional potential as coalition partner and stable electoral base not linked with identity preferences. Their strategy might be considering as *catch-all regionalist party and centrist moderate platform*. It includes the following points:

1. alternative pole is likely to play a mediator role between nationalists and unionists with the politics of “shared future”;
2. Alliance Party of Northern Ireland is most moderate, middle ground of the major parties; it attracts equal support from both Catholics and Protestants;
3. focus on desegregation, anti sectarianism and social unity between communities: 45.5% of Alliance supporters consider themselves to be primarily Northern Irish which is more than any other of the other main parties.

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Citizenship for Security: The Ideological War on Terrorism in the UK¹⁸

Introduction

Following 9/11, Muslims immigrants living in the West have been securitised. At the same time, policies were developed in Western Europe for facilitating immigrant integration. However, the securitisation of communities involves perceiving them as others, in binary opposition with national identities. This is at odds with the aim of integration that requires the acceptance of these communities as part of the society.

This paper examines the above-mentioned dilemma in the case of the UK, specifically in response to the national security threats assumed by the public discourse upon developments following 9/11. After the presentation of the citizenship and integration policies and the Muslim community in Britain, the securitization process which Muslims in the UK went through, will be discussed in the context of the relationship between citizenship and the war on terrorism.

Immigration, Citizenship and Muslims in the UK

Although it is not a classical country of immigration such as the USA or Canada, the UK was more open to immigration and had a multiculturalist policy approach that facilitated immigrant groups to retain their socio-cultural differences.

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¹⁸ This paper is a summary, based on the author's PhD dissertation, the findings of which were previously published. Please refer to the original article for citations. Cilingir, S. (2020). "The securitisation-integration dilemma: The case of British Muslims". *Migration Letters*, 17(1): 165-177.

In a similar vein, its citizenship policy was open to the inclusion of immigrants due to the *jus soli* (land basis) principle for citizenship at birth, and easy naturalization (allowing dual citizenship, low criteria regarding residence and language). (Hansen, 2003) This was related to the imperial legacy as well as the fact that despite the English were dominant; the UK was a multinational state with strong regional identities that prevented ethnic nationalism to become the ideology of the state that governs citizenship policy. (Cesarani, 1996)

The Muslim community of the UK started to form as a result of immigration in the post-Second World War era and mostly originated from previous colonies of the Empire, now called the "New Commonwealth". Until the 1960s, Commonwealth citizens could have automatic citizenship if they moved and settled in the UK. Due to the *jus soli* principle, their children born in the UK could become citizens as well. As a result, unlike Western European countries in the Continent, Muslims in the UK were predominantly citizens, "British" Muslims. However, over time, citizenship laws became more restrictive, preventing automatic citizenship for immigrants from former colonies. (Cesarani, 1996)

This was due to the formation of non-white communities in a white country. Concerns over triggering more immigration from less developed countries of Asia and Africa, a two-tier policy was developed with regard to immigration and integration. Discriminating against the non-white former colonies, immigration was restricted and citizenship acquisition became more difficult for those from the New Commonwealth, compared to immigrants from the Old Commonwealth, who had ancestral ties with the homeland. (Solomos, 2003) While immigration was restricted, a progressive antidiscrimination policy for ethnic and racial minorities was established. The state allowed for non-white communities of immigrant origin to embrace their own beliefs and culture, passing to the new generations. Nonetheless, this pluralistic understanding was geared more towards maintaining public order than an ideological stance on the part of governments, because the

country was experiencing "race riots" as a result of the socioeconomic disadvantages experienced by the non-white communities (Favell, 1998). Moreover, the antidiscrimination policy and state support for minority communities did not include Muslims because it only covered minorities through ethnicity or race, not through religion. (Grillo, 2009)

Securitisation of Muslims in the UK after 9/11

Securitisation is a concept coined by the Copenhagen School of security studies, in the context of the post-Cold War security agenda of the international community, as well as the academia. In response to the understanding of security as a positive development (i.e. being safe), such as its use in the term human security, the School concentrated on its negative meaning. Positioned within social constructivism, the scholars drew attention to the construction of issues that were not under the classical understanding of security (i.e. national defense), by speech acts (the uttering of security) of policy makers that moved that issue in the security realm. For these scholars, the grammar of security transposes the issue to an existential matter, a matter of life and death, resulting in a dualistic understanding that undermines the normal politics, allowing for extreme measures, which would not be legitimate otherwise. By creating a case of emergency, securitisation has the potential of the suspension of human rights, especially in the area of societal security, which the scholars believed immigration was constructed in post-Cold War Europe. (Waever, et.al., 1993)

According to the Copenhagen School, the securitisation of immigration in post-Cold War Europe happened in the societal field. Here, the referent object constructed to be under an existential threat is the society, rather than the state. Specifically, securitising moves argue that the collective identity is at stake because of immigrants. (Waever, et.al., 1993) In the field of immigration, securitisation includes a Schmittian polity, where societal groups are in conflict with another in a

way that creates the very existence of the national community. In other words, it includes and surpasses othering by adding a threat dimension to cultural and/or religious minorities or immigrant groups. (Williams, 2003)

The Muslim community in the UK was already othered since the 1980s when they pursued a politics of difference, demanding more visibility in the public realm and mobilising in protest of some foreign policy decisions of the UK, which, in their perception, would harm the Muslim World. The political and academic communities interpreted their demands for recognition as a warning sign that they did not belong to, or fit in, the Western liberal democratic ideals. This not only estranged the society from the Muslim community, but also led to a retreat from multiculturalism as an immigrant accommodation policy (Modood, 2003).

Othering turned into securitisation after 9/11. In the year 2001, in addition to the terror attack in the USA, which had a deep impact on the public perception of Muslims in the Western World in general through rising Islamophobia, inner city riots had happened in Northern UK, involving Muslims. Triggered by white extremists, Pakistani youth from deprived inner city areas in the North clashed with the extremists as well as the police force. The bureaucratic discourse described these groups through their ethnicity rather than religion (Asian Youth). However, the official reports prioritised culture, rather than racism or deprivation. The Cantle Report, which the government relied upon for later policy, described the most important problem as segregation of communities:

“Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges” (Cantle, 2001: 9).

Rather than tackling white extremism, the report argued for “community cohesion”, through which increased interactions between communities upon

common issues would foster peace between communities and therefore maintain the public order (Cantle, 2001). The Home Office Secretary Blunkett, argued that British citizenship was weak and it should foster belonging, by facilitating active participation of communities. (Blunkett, 2002) In this period, British citizenship was constructed in a pluralistic manner. It was acknowledged that Britain was multicultural, but instead of difference, shared values were stressed. (Cantle, 2001).

At first glance, this discourse on collective identity was inclusive of Muslims. However, it emphasised the culturally different characteristics of immigrant communities. Muslims were assigned the responsibility to initiate interactions with the white community, and show that they belonged to Britain, in order to overcome prejudices against them. The political and bureaucratic discourse emphasised duties and allegiance towards Britain, which meant that the Muslim community was supposed to be deficient in this field. Respect for women's rights and proficiency of the English language were also emphasized as shared values of Britishness, as components of the new, thicker notion of citizenship that was expected to be embraced by the Muslim community. (Home Office, 2005) This policy orientation towards cohesion through citizenship happened not only as a response to the 2001 riots, but also as part of post-9/11 perception of Muslim immigrants. For instance, Blunkett defined 9/11 as an offense towards societal values and modernity with the following words:

"People who talk about a clash of civilizations also imply the West has a moral superiority over Islamic culture. This is scarcely credible ... This is not to say ... that there isn't a continuing tension between modernity and the cultural practices of some of those entering highly advanced countries ... They are making a journey in the space of a few weeks or months, which it has taken us hundreds of years to make ... now rejected [norms in Britain], remain acceptable from particular cultures of varying religions" (Blunkett, 2002).

The discourse had an impact on actual policies. Immigration and citizenship law became more restrictive after 2001, and the expectation of integration proved through language proficiency and citizenship knowledge were added to the criteria for both immigration and citizenship. (Home Office, 2005).

Citizenship and integration policy became more directly related in the war of terrorism, after 7/7 terror attacks of 2005 in London. When it was discovered that there were Muslim immigrants that lived in the UK among the perpetrators, the problem of home-grown terrorism became a top priority in the counterterrorism agenda. The fact that there could be more terrorists among the British Muslim community created a climate of distrust. Just as Blunkett did in response to 9/11, Prime Minister Blair defined the 7/7 bombings as an attack against British values, which he assumed were shared by the majority of the Muslim community, but not all. He saw radical Islamism as a continuous threat that may come from within:

"We know that this fringe of extremism does not truly represent Islam. We know British Muslims, in general, abhor the actions of the extremists ... But coming to Britain is not a right ... staying here carries with it a duty ... to share and support the values that sustain the British way of life. Those that break that duty and try to incite hatred or engage in violence against our country and its people have no place here" (Blair, 2005).

As a response to 7/7, an ideological war was declared against radical Islamists and it was made part of the counterterrorism strategy.

The UK's counterterrorism strategy in response to the 7/7 attacks was initiated in 2006. It was made up of four sub-strategies: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare (HM Government, 2006). The ideological battle was to be fought within the framework of Prevent. The idea was that further radical Islamist terror attacks could be prevented if the government worked with the British Muslim community to reduce radicalisation in general. Launched in 2007, the Prevent strategy was

revised during Brown and Cameron governments, but remained a part of the counterterrorism strategy. (DCLG, 2007; HM Government, 2008a; 2008b; 2011)

The strategy documents portrayed radical Islamist terrorism in binary opposition with national identity, constructed as liberal, democratic, and pluralistic. Shared values related to this identity remained a nodal point around which the concept of active citizenship - which was introduced in 2001 in response to the Northern city riots - was developed. Respect for other cultures were included as part of the national identity. The list of values remained the same and were framed similarly by Labour and coalition governments. However, instead of emphasizing plurality, the discourse prioritized commonalities between different ethnic and religious communities. (DCLG, 2007; HM Government, 2008b; 2011).

Prevent strategy had three subfields: (1) ideological struggle, (2) strengthening the Muslim mainstream, and (3) interventions at the individual level. The first was related to Islam as a belief system. It consisted of challenging the discursive framework by which Islamist radicalism portrayed the West in opposition to Islam as a belief system and culture. All governments argued that British identity did not exclude Islam. Islam was a peaceful religion. However, radical Islamists worked to create a false consciousness among Muslims as an excuse for violence. To refute their claims was at the core of this ideological struggle and it was a responsibility falling upon the Muslim community. The role of the government would be supporting Muslim scholars and ideologues to defend Islam against radicalistic propaganda. The second subfield was related to citizenship. For the governments, if citizenship values were strengthened, Islamist radicalism would have no appeal to, and would find no ground among the British Muslim community, most of whom were assumed as moderate. In this vein, governments supported projects for community cohesion (Labour governments) and preventing extremist propaganda (all governments). The third subfield was at the level of the individual, rather than the community. With the help of government officials, social workers

and civil society staff who had direct communication with individuals who were vulnerable against terrorists' propaganda, could be detected and intervened before they turned to violence. (DCLG, 2007; HM Government, 2008a; 2008b; 2011).

The promotion of community cohesion around the concept of active citizenship was prevalent in all subfields of the Prevent strategy. Here, integration was portrayed both as the problem and the solution for security. Compared to the prior period, the discourse around counterterrorism differed in its construction of the Muslim as a potential other. In the Prevent framework, Muslims were mentioned as citizens, rather than immigrants. Their identity was constructed by 'logic of difference'. In other words, there were good Muslims, who shared British values and way of life, and bad Muslims, who were radicalized and prone to violence against the state and the national community. (see Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000: 10-11) The Muslim other was a potential terrorist, estranged from true Islam and the integrated majority of Muslims. The linkage between citizenship and counterterrorism remained in place during the following coalition government. (HM Government, 2011; DCLG, 2012)

Following 7/7, immigration restrictions continued. Security concerns dominated both socioeconomic and sociocultural criteria for allowing foreigners to settle in the UK and become citizens. Integration criteria were raised for all immigrant categories, and counterterrorism measures continued to spill-over into immigration and citizenship policy. (Epifanio, 2011). The liberal-conservative coalition placed Prevent strategy under Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015), solidifying the linkage between security and citizenship. As a result, the Muslims' integration and embracing of citizenship values became an issue under surveillance. Rather than politics of exception, this situation demonstrates the characteristics of "politics of unease", coined by the Paris School of securitization. The Paris School agrees with the Copenhagen School that immigration is securitised, but focuses on the institutionalisation of securitisation rather than the speech acts. Through the spill-over from the political to the bureaucratic realm, the idea of immigrants posing

a potential threat becomes reinforced, turning into a hegemonic discourse (Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008; Huysmans, 2011). The securitisation of Muslim identity in a counterterrorism framework resulted in the empowering of security bureaucracy over integration. Muslim community organisations had to focus on strengthening citizenship values if they needed funding, which was mostly done under the Prevent strategy. This climate of suspicion and scrutiny towards the Muslim community led to criticisms of the government for treating Muslims as terror suspects (see Johnson, 2010).

Conclusion

In the UK, Muslims' sociopolitical integration has been framed as a matter of societal security since 2001. The perceived deficiencies in the Muslims community's allegiance and belonging to Britain led to the construction of a discourse in which British values and way of life were portrayed to be under an existential threat. Moreover, Muslims' alleged deficiency of integration were linked to more classical fields of security: public order (the 2001 riots) and national security (7/7 attacks), which facilitated its institutionalisation.

The citizenship identity constructed through securitisation was civic and pluralistic. Nonetheless, because that the discourse and related policies were contextualized under security, the inclusiveness of the policies under sociopolitical integration is doubtful. Integration is a voluntary process. It requires openness and changes in the host community as well as the immigrant community. The continued threat perception from British Muslims' identity would undermine the willingness of the host society to accept and the willingness of the Muslims to belong, making integration more difficult.

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SYMBOLIC RESOURCES OF IDENTITY POLICIES AT LOCAL LEVEL

Symbolic politics as a component of identity politics is a powerful institutional resource of local authorities. It can be used to consolidate the inhabitants of rural areas, their involvement in project activities, mobilization to solve socio-political problems [1,2,3,4].

The purpose of this study is to determine the resource potential of symbolic politics in the structure of the identity policy of local territories in the Krasnodar territory. The problematic field of this work is determined by the dynamics characteristic of the identity policy of the region under study – the Krasnodar territory. In the municipalities of this region, different activities of the main political actors shaping the identity policy at the local level are demonstrated.

In the study conducted by the research team, the methods of focus group discussion and expert survey were used. Focus groups identified markers of symbolic politics and the main types of local identities in the selected municipalities. The choice of four municipalities of the Krasnodar Territory (Temryuksky District, Apsheronsky District, Timashevsky District, Krylovsky District) for the field study was due to the need to cover the wide geography of the region and consider the characteristics of various climatic and geographical zones.

At the municipal level, there are several groups of intangible resources that play an important role in the development and implementation of symbolic policy at the local level. Along with network resources (social capital of local communities, density of interpersonal and institutional ties, levels of interpersonal and institutional trust), organizational and managerial resources, leadership, institutions of local self-government and self-organization of citizens, personnel potential of local communities, development policy actors and their management practices), information and communication resources (availability and degree of development of print, electronic and online media, interactive interfaces for interaction between members of the local community and subjects of territorial development policy); symbolic resources are among the intangible resources.

The following functions of symbolic politics in rural areas can be defined:

- Communicative. Symbolic politics is an important tool for ensuring information and communication interaction between the government and society.
- Mobilization (the organization of mass actions to clean up public spaces, become important tools in the process of mobilizing the population).
- Aesthetic. Sculptural objects, traditional festivals, exhibitions, performances not only form the cultural image of the territory but are also a powerful means of attracting tourists.
- Ideological. Using historical, socio-economic and cultural symbols that are significant for residents, municipal authorities and the media can enhance local patriotism, help create socio-political groups.
- Electoral. At the local level, technologies for constructing socio-political reality are being implemented. These technologies are implemented by various actors, they include not only representatives of the ruling party and the ruling elite, but also the intellectual creative elite, independent civil activists, and public organizations.

The symbolic dimensions of identity politics include toponymy, urban cultural landscapes, urban monuments, state rituals, symbols (visibly perceived by citizens in everyday life). The listed forms of actualization of symbolic politics are endowed with ideological content, capable of producing and imposing ideas about the social world. In modern conditions, more and more attention are paid to increasing the role of intangible resources in the socio-economic development of local territories. Within the framework of this study, we were interested in the issue of using the symbolic policy resource in the development of rural areas. In this study, we were interested in the issue of using the resource of symbolic politics in the development of rural areas.

We have developed a system of formalized markers and created a criterion matrix for the classification of symbolic politics, including the dominant marker of symbolic politics, the temporal orientation of residents, subjective involvement by categories of residents.

Holidays and rituals are an important part of the symbolic politics on the ground. In addition to national holidays, respondents in all rural settlements celebrated the day of the village or farm as a significant event.

On the day of the village, we always gather in large numbers for almost the whole day. It all starts in the morning with sports competitions, because a lot of young people and children go in for sports. We get a church and 2 fields next to the stadium, so everything happens again here, nearby. Park area nearby. Therefore, everything starts with sports competitions, it all smoothly flows to the sites, there

are game programs. We invite trampolines there, trade and everything else. The concert program is definitely big. We invite teams. In the evening it's fireworks (an extract from the focus group describing the day of the Kubanskaya village).

We have noted personalized symbols as dominant markers of symbolic politics in the village of Kubanskaya, as the residents focused on their reference contemporaries, who made a significant contribution to the development of the territory:

Well, our old-timers are our pride. Ivan Matveevich – so many years in office, he is known everywhere;

Taisiya Nikolaevna, a person who has worked in the administration for so many years. Ask her for any person – she will answer. Everybody knows;

We know that Ivan Matveevich loves grants. That is, all the programs that take place in the region, he knows them, probably by heart. And an assistant, Alexandra Viktorovna, with whom they work all the time. They know what is being held where, how, where you can join to improve the life of the Kuban rural settlement. And to say this not only at the district level, but also at the regional level.

The temporal orientation of the village of Kubanskaya was defined as promising, as indicated by such factors as the desire of respondents to develop their "small homeland", a positive vision of the future of the territory, and the presence of specific development projects:

The teachers are back. I have almost all the local youth (working);

Personnel shortage is not felt as much as it can be in others. We have settlements of 300, 500 people, 800, and it is difficult to find personnel there;

Because the station is the best. Developing. The grounds are so well worth it.

Various groups and individual actors can act as the main subjects that form and broadcast symbolic politics. So, in the Bednyagina village, along with local self-government bodies traditional for rural settlements and a cultural and educational network, a group of farming and entrepreneurial enterprises was distinguished by residents as actors of symbolic politics:

Here we have four main farmers, that is, on the ninth of May, only at the expense of farm sponsorship, labor veterans, home front workers, prisoners – all these categories, we have 16 of them today, in my opinion, or 18 people left. That is, by the ninth of May, we set the table, this is a sure fire, this is a gift to everyone, plus it is a soldier's porridge, plus some kind of ammunition, banners, balloons, something else - it's all on their shoulders. The second big holiday is Farm Day, the first or second Saturday of August. That is, too, all gifts, prizes, it's all only at their

expense, from the budget of the settlement, well, the maximum that we are letters of thanks, the frames that we present ...

Social infrastructure objects can also act as dominant markers of symbolic politics. In the village of Medvedovskaya, such objects are an orphanage, a boarding school and a cultural center:

Due to the fact that a large village, we also have a psycho-neurological boarding school. This is also a great attention", "Probably our orphanage in Art. Medvedovskaya is known not only in the region, but in general in Russia they know", "Out of 9 settlements in the region, not a single settlement has two houses of culture, plus we also have 2 more farms and on each farm, such, rural clubs.

The case of the village of Oktyabrskaya is curious, in which the dominant marker of symbolic politics is economic specialization, namely, the involvement of the local population in the cultivation and sale of seedlings:

The fundamental difference, probably, is still our October seedlings. They are known not only in the region, but throughout the region. Because you can go into every yard, and there will be roses, ornamental plants. And such a list that we ourselves do not know what it is with the neighbors. We go and ask.

Symbolic politics at the local level is the institutional mechanism of identity politics. The presence of local identity among members of the local community becomes an important criterion for assessing the development of the territory. The subjects of identity politics interested in such development, primarily local governments, often become the main actors in the process of forming the local identity of local communities.

The results of the empirical study showed that rural settlements demonstrate models of symbolic politics based on the actualization of various markers of symbolic politics. The matrix presented in the study can be used to assess the potential of the symbolic resources of local territories. The results of our study demonstrate the diversity of symbolic policy resources as part of identity politics at the local level, as well as the possibilities of integrating symbolic means and technologies into the institutional policy of local authorities.

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IDENTITY POLITICS IN DIGITAL SPACE

The contemporary dynamics of identities is inseparably linked with the deep public transformations, changing institutional and socio-cultural basis of the modern world. The contemporary reality represents a new qualitative stage of social development in which the individuals with the increasing complexity of their existence become the key subjects of social and political changes. The rapidly changing social reality is reflected in the variety of metaphorical definitions (the "individualized society" by Z. Bauman, "society of risk" by U. Beck, "network society" by M. Castells, "infomodernity" by I. Semenenko and V. Lapkin). Personal and potentially interactive connection to the global "information environment" by means of which social individuals learn new universal norms and standards of behaviour, new living conditions and new restrictions of access to resources" appear to be a condition of the development of such space¹⁹.

M. Castells writes that networks in particular produce new social morphology of our communities and the dissemination of networking logic considerably affects the course and result of the processes linked with production, everyday life, culture and power²⁰. In these conditions, network communication and network structures emerging in various spheres of public life and taking the leading positions, become at the same time both a driving force of civilization development and its results.

Network identity is an identification by a person (user) of himself with a particular group created on the network; virtual self-presentation. Network identity is a reflection of the plurality of identities and reinforces it in virtual communication. At the same time, it can also be considered as a kind of spatial identity, meaning the virtual space of information and communication flows as an environment and at the same time as a landmark of self-identification²¹. The practice of identity

¹⁹ Lapkin, Vladimir.V. and Semenenko, Irina.S. "The Political Person" Before Challenges of "Infomodernity". Polis. Political Studies, 6 (2013): 64-81.

²⁰ Castells, Manuel. The Power of Identity: The Information Age. (Economy, Society, and Culture). 2nd ed. Malden MA, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

²¹ Fadeeva, Lubov A. "Network Identity". Political Identity and Policy of Identity: in 2 vol. Vol. 1: Identity as Category of Political Science: Dictionary of Terms and Concepts. Ed. Irina S. Semenenko. Moscow: ROSSPEN Publ., 2011. 67-70.

development shows that for many modern individuals, belonging to network groups is more real than belonging to those groups in the real world in which they are included by sociologists.

In cyberspace, political identity is associated with the accumulation of three forms of resources: 1) objectified (resources provided by the software and hardware capabilities of the interaction platform - chat, website, email, etc.); 2) institutionalized (authority among the participants of virtual network communities, empathy); 3) incorporated (communicative competence, information culture, the possibility of interactive communication in real time, etc.)

There are several vectors of influence of network society on the formation of political identity. First of all, it is overcoming of "digital dualism" (separation of digital and physical reality): anonymity and related games with identity dictated by the specifics of virtual communication are losing their relevance. In conditions of collecting and analyzing digital traces and big data, real identity is practically merging from the virtual, turning into a single digital personality profile, transferring a person's private life to the public sphere. In political scientific discourse, this trend was recorded by S.V. Tikhonova.

Another vector is expressed in the rapid development of complex, hybrid forms of identities (this process takes place offline, but the use of network technologies stimulates and accelerates it). Under such conditions, the dominant model for answering the question "who are we?" becomes a "mobile identity", which is based on the political and psychological mechanisms of imitation and infection.

The rapid spread (and in some cases the predominance) of visualized or synthetic (such as a meme) forms of political identification has become an obvious trend. Memes are involved in the formation of identity, the actualization of personal experiences, the reproduction and accumulation of social capital, create the illusion of belonging. Memes affect the formation and addition of a social and individual picture of the world.

The undoubted vector is the contradictory interweaving of positive and negative effects of the influence of digitalization on identity politics. Positive effects are manifested primarily in the formation in network interaction of competencies that are in demand by modern reality - emotional intelligence, collective creativity, adaptability, openness. The negative effects include the danger of clustering people according to various criteria, the creation of individual social ratings (like the Chinese experiment), the simplification of speech and the inability to compose a

coherent text; "information bulimia", etc. The increase in negative effects gave rise to the "digital detox" movement - a conscious refusal to use gadgets and ignoring social networks for a certain period.

The typology of the political identity of network communities is proposed. The first type of identity is associated with the formation of stable solidarities, that is representing networks of interpersonal connections and interactions based on social identity and providing information and support. They fulfill personal needs in society, relying on new communication opportunities, which, in turn, contributes to their integration into the global digital space of sociality created by the Internet. These communities have a stable set of identifications and value orientations that allow them to maintain stable interactions, which is a resource basis for real actions in politics.

The second type of identity is a special type of identification and consolidation of users - transit solidarity, which is characterized by a spontaneous (non-programmed) nature of occurrence and demonstrates a spontaneous digital distribution mechanism; brief public display of unity; focus on symbolic communicative interactions. These communities have a mobile basis for identification, they are characterized by the absence of really binding social ties and complexes of value orientations that can create paradoxical configurations of participants in network communities that have conflict interactions in a traditional environment. For transit communities, the priority is the process of consolidation and integration (involvement in the event, not in the community), and not the result (formed stable foundations of unity).

In the modern social and humanistic knowledge, the problem of appearance and distribution of network mechanisms of identity formation has no clear conceptual grounding, but is comprehended within the identity studies in the conditions of the formation of new social reality. The first group of research, considering the conditions, processes and results of identity formation in the post-present, focuses on the virtualization of social reality as the mechanism, transforming the vital space of individuals and spheres of their activities²². In the system of virtual reality based on multimedia and digital technologies, meanings create the space of cultural codes, symbols and ideologies, becoming the continuation of the existing public space of human habitation. The second group of

²² Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Realität der Massenmedien*. Wiesbaden: Sozialwissenschaften I GWV Fachverlage GmbH, 2004.

research studies the mechanisms, based on the technological capabilities of interfaces of social online networking services, promoting the formation of network identity which is considered as construction of a personality project in online space, directed to the satisfaction of various individuals' needs.

The networking mechanisms of identity formation represent a complex of interrelated and interdependent practices in global information and communicative space, contributing to individual and collective identification, interiorization and reflection. The complex includes the mechanism of network communication, mechanism of reflexive involvement of a person into public space, mechanism of network topos-structuring and mechanism of public crowdsourcing.

The mechanism of network communication, based on technological systems Web 2.0 and Web 3.0., represents a method of producing individual and collective forms of information accumulation, creation/dissemination of new content/knowledge. The functionality of the mechanism of network communication for reproducing/positioning traditional identities and creating new identities lies in its digital nature (readiness and openness for changes) and network ethos (orientation to the integration into the community of actors, differing in value orientations and statuses, and provision of the cooperation between them on the basis of the development of uniform value-standard complex).

The mechanism of network communication allows individuals to create and manage their identities in online public space that is characteristic of the representatives of "digital generation". In modern social knowledge, "digital generation" denotes the population of the people who were born in the 1980s and were growing during the exponential development of the Internet. Through understanding the value orientations of individual activity, the mechanisms of network communication make it possible for individuals to develop as active subjects who are able to develop their own systems of social identity, fitting into the solidary communities of social space of a certain society on the basis of priority identifications.

The mechanism of reflexive involvement of individuals into public space is characterized as the conceptualization by individuals and collective actors of the independent social worlds, requiring to create their own virtualized public spaces but being closely linked with the common social space. The duality of the results of reflexive involvement of individuals is shown in the emergence of "network feudal lords and serfs" in the space of public policy. On the basis of legitimate practical schemes and explicit concepts, so-called "network feudal lords", i.e. individuals or political actors, independently and originally interpret political events, creating

around themselves the place or the problem with a projective set of public solutions. Individuals or political actors, who do not participate in the creation of public spaces but appeal to the judgment of social and political events on the basis of identification with the created "network feudal lords" of cognitive schemes and practical solutions, become "information serfs" in the created public spaces. Assessing the civilization changes resulting from the information and communication revolution, U.Eco came to conclusion in his work of 1998 that in the near future the society will divide into two groups: those who consume media products as "ready" images and judgments of the world without critical judgment of the obtained information; and those who are capable to originate the reality, using information and communication technologies²³. The communicative network structure of online space gives an opportunity to various social and political actors to project and position new identities which bearers are oriented on active social actions in public sphere. The formation of such identities happens due to mechanisms of network topos-structuring and public crowdsourcing.

A topos is understood as an open plenty of practices and practical schemes linked with a certain social problem or "the place of actors' communication". Network topos-structuring represents the mechanism of public space formation in which the practical schemes, practices, and resources of actors of public policy and structures of public management are integrated into a single coordinated project of the solution of a specific localized problem. In a topos as intersubjective reality, an idea sets the limits of made decisions. Topos frequently makes conditions for the occurrence of the networks of social solidarity showing the civil actions that are independent from the public power, directed to the solution of a public problem.

Crowdsourcing represents a goal-oriented activity of actors (social, economic, and political) in the use of resources of individuals, grouped into public networks in online space for collective creation (ideas and projects) and/or consolidate (solutions and practices) innovations in various spheres of public life (business and social or political spheres). The collective intelligence of individual actors, conducting crowdsourcing activities in organized public networks, becomes a source of innovations²⁴. As the networking mechanism of identity formation, crowdsourcing

²³ Eco, Umberto. "From the Internet to Gutenberg: Text and Hypertext: Fragments from a Public Lecture at Moscow State University". *New Literary Review*, 32 (1998): 5-14.

²⁴ Miroshnichenko, Inna V. "Modernization Potential of Crowdsourcing in Contemporary Public Policy: Russian Experience and Foreign Practice". *Problem Analysis and Public Administration Projection Theory Practice Methodology*, 4.6 (2011): 33-39.

refers to the method of the organization of network communities in the form of public networks allowing to actualize various needs of individuals for the development and implementation of collective ideas or projects, aiming at the solution of public problems.

Public networks for solving crowdsourcing tasks are created in crowdsourcing projects on the basis of situation-problem identification with other individuals interested in the solution of a public problem during the given time period in online space. Both individuals and their communities and institutionalized actors (authorities, non-profit organizations, and businesses) can act as the subjects of creation of crowdsourcing projects and, respectively, projection of situation-problem identities.

The complex of networking mechanisms forms a dynamic matrix of identity of modern persons allowing to use opportunities for their development in contemporary conditions of the formation of new social reality. At the same time, the complex of network mechanisms is not sustained; its content depends on those institutional practices which will determine further the conditions, processes and results of formation of identities, requiring their conceptual understanding and empirical research in social sciences.